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In What Senses are Free Spirits
Free?1
Christa Davis Acampora
My broadest claim in this article is, unsurprisingly, that there are multi-
ple senses of freedom associated with the freedom of the free spirit. These
include both positive and negative senses – that is, when describing how
free spirits are free, Nietzsche sometimes characterizes this as freedom to do
something, and sometimes as freedom from certain kinds of constraints. In
this article, I do not aim to provide an exhaustive catalogue of the diﬀerent
senses invoked in Nietzsche’s ‘free spirit’ texts. Instead, I wish to highlight
some particular senses, including some that are less frequently discussed
in the scholarly literature and account for how these diﬀering senses are
related, including some puzzling ideas that Nietzsche appears to hold re-
garding how these diﬀerent senses might be realizable simultaneously. In
thinking through this, I believe, we are presented with ideas that bear on
Nietzsche’s views about freedom more generally.
1This text originated as a presentation at theWarwickNietzscheWorkshop:The Philosophy
of the Free Spirit, March 2012. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the British Acad-
emy, the University of Warwick Philosophy Department, and Keith Ansell Pearson, the
workshop organizer. I also developed some of the ideas here in discussion with audiences
at Stony Brook University and those in attendance at the Nietzsche in Assos conference in
Assos, Turkey, July 2013.
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1. What are free spirits free from? A sense of
negative freedom in Nietzsche
We can begin with one of the most obvious senses of freedom of the free
spirit, and perhaps one that at least some people think of as the primary (or,
even exclusive) sense in which free spirits are free: namely, in terms of being
free from certain claims of society, particularly those regarded as customary
and binding. As Nietzsche begins to develop the notion of the free spirit
in those works designated as part of a series on the free spirit, Nietzsche
carefully works through how customs claim – as well as make possible –
individuals. This binding force is exploited by morality, which has a variety
of tactics for shaping and molding both the psychic and physical forms
of human existence. In this respect, morality makes a particular kind of
common life possible while it establishes terms for distinction that make
one recognizable as an individual, either through exceptional realization of
the positively esteemed way of life or by virtue of one standing out from it.
At times, the freedom of the free spirit is at least partially constituted
by his or her (or perhaps its – if we don’t think free spirits are actual people
or even a type of person but rather spiritual forms that can be realized at
various times and to various degrees) ability to loosen, if not escape, these
bonds. Nietzsche sometimes talks about this feature as a step, sometimes
as an initial or at least early stage in a developmental process of becoming
a free spirit,2 and later he designates some as ‘free, very free spirits’. Free
spirits are contrasted inNietzsche’s texts and in the scholarly literature with
various kinds of so-called ‘fettered spirits’.The free spirits are envisioned by
Nietzsche as not bound to the morality of custom, convention, superstition,
or even morality itself and the habits of thinking (or not thinking) and
valuing that characterize such views. Free spirits are, minimally, free of
this. In short, they have a certain kind of independence that fettered spirits
lack.
One form of such independence that Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes
is independence or freedom from association: solitude, being able to with-
2For a developmental account of the free spirit, particularly in relation to Nietzsche’s views
about science and culture, see Jonathan Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study
of Nietzsche’s Human, All-Too-Human (New York: Prometheus, 2010).
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stand a lack of human companionship. There are quite a few passages in
which solitude is described in a sense that suggests at least one of the ways
Nietzsche conceives it is in terms of being free from (so we have another
negative sense of freedom), the demands of others, being free from oblig-
ations, associations, and their influences.
This is particularly evident in Beyond Good and Evil in the final section
of the part titled ‘Der Freie Geist’:
At home, or at least having been guests, in many countries
of the spirit; having escaped again and again from the musty
agreeable nooks into which preference and prejudice, youth,
origin, the accidents of people and books or even exhaustion
from wandering seemed to have banished us; full of malice
against the lures of dependence that lie hidden in honors, or
money, or oﬃces, or enthusiasms of the senses; . . . we are born,
sworn, jealous friends of solitude, of our own most profound,
most midnightly, most middaily solitude: that is the type of
man we are, we free spirits!3
And further, in GM I.7, where Nietzsche writes:
Every philosopher would speak as Buddha did when he was
told of the birth of a son: ‘Rahula has been born to me, a fetter
has been forged for me’ (Rahula here means ‘a little demon’);
every ‘free spirit’ would experience a thoughtful moment, sup-
posing he had previously experienced a thoughtless one, of
the kind that once came to the same Buddha – ‘narrow and
oppressive’, he thought to himself, ‘is life in a house, a place
of impurity; freedom lies in leaving the house’: ‘thinking thus,
he left the house.’
3Citations of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals are drawn
fromWalter Kaufmann’s translation of BGE (New York: Vintage Books, 1966) and Kauf-
mann and R.J. Hollingdale’s translation of GM in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce
Homo (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).
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This is obviously not the only purpose or benefit of solitude as Nietzsche
sees it, and it is a topic that warrants its own discussion, but it is certainly
an evident strand in Nietzsche’s thinking about the respect in which the
free spirit is free. Free spirits to some extent appear to be negatively free of
others, communally and individually.
If we look at how Nietzsche compares and contrasts free spirits with
fettered ones, as Bernard Reginster does in his article on Nietzsche and
fanaticism,4 then we see that the free spirits are also free from a certain
kind of relationship to truth. To be sure, they care very much about the
truth, and this motivates what they question and how. But they have a
somewhat diﬀerent relation to truth. This suggests, if the analysis holds,
that free spirits are free in ways that might diﬀer from their free-thinking
Enlightenment counterparts. For they, too, certainly prized truth and also
might be thought to value ‘thinking for oneself ’ in ways which, on the face
of it, would appear congenial to Nietzsche’s views, but Nietzsche is quite
clear that his free spirits are distinctive.We see this quite clearly inBGE 25,
where Nietzsche points to Bruno, and by implication to Nietzsche’s own
contemporary free thinkers who idealize him as their forefather. Bruno
(1548–1600) is the sort of figure who we might imagine would have ap-
pealed to Nietzsche. Bruno was martyred for his support of the ideas of
Copernicus. He was shunned from nearly every academic community on
account of his opposition to Aristotle; he advanced the view that the world
was eternal and ever-changing, and he anticipated a theory of relativity in
his arguments against Aristotle’s notions of opposites: ‘There is no absolute
up or down, as Aristotle taught; no absolute position in space; but the po-
sition of a body is relative to that of other bodies. Everywhere there is
incessant relative change in position throughout the universe, and the ob-
server is always at the center of things.’5 In a play he wrote, which evokes
themes of satyr plays, Bruno features the ‘ass of Cyllene’, which skewers
superstition. The ‘ass’ is everywhere, not only in the church at the time of
the ass festival (and at other times) but also in all other public institutions,
4Bernhard Reginster, ‘What is a Free Spirit?: Nietzsche on fanaticism,’ Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie 85, no. 1 (2003): 51–85.
5Jennifer Michael Hecht, Doubt: A history (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), p. 294.
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including the courts and the schools.6 Bruno was a skeptic, particularly
about theological matters where scientific reasoning oﬀered evidence that
contradicts matters of faith, and he was an advocate of free thought.
It would seem that Bruno would be a good model for a free spirit. And
he was – but not the sort that Nietzsche appears to be advocating. Bruno
was an icon for the ‘free thinkers’ (Freiedenken) movement, with which
Nietzsche explicitly contrasts his free spirits in BGE 44. Some context re-
lated to the composition of the text is helpful. Nietzsche finished BGE in
early summer 1885. During the period when he was writing the text he
spent time in Venice, a home of Bruno. While Nietzsche was in Venice,
a group of notable figures formed an international committee to erect a
monument to Bruno on the site of his execution in Rome. The committee
included Victor Hugo (cf. TI ‘Skirmishes’ 1), Herbert Spencer, Ernest Re-
nan (cf. TI ‘Skirmishes’ 2), Ernst Haeckel, Henrik Ibsen, and Ferdinand
Gregorovius. So if we want to know who it is that Nietzsche targets when
he talks about the wrong kind of free spirits, we might explore these. The
statue of Bruno was eventually erected in 1889.
At least part of Nietzsche’s opposition to his contemporary free
thinkers, particularly those who take Bruno as an icon, focuses on the fact
that the martyrs to truth evince a kind of unconditionality that ultimately
imprisons, fetters perhaps, with even more grave consequences than those
who otherwise shirk Enlightenment ideals. Truth at any price – even when
used to oppose superstition and the Christianized worldview – might be
thought to replace one god with another. It seems clear that Nietzsche
thinks his own free spirits are also free from this, or they at least strive to
be such – they are oriented toward a kind of freedom from unconditionality,
including – perhaps especially – with respect to their valuation of truth.
There are two features of this idea of freedom-from-unconditionality
that I wish to underscore in characterizing the freedom of the free spirit.
Negatively, the free spirit is detached from a particular commitment to
truth – in advance of and even in the face of some reasons to believe oth-
erwise. The free spirit is free from compromising commitment. But there is
6Kathleen Marie Higgins, ‘Nietzsche and the Mystery of the Ass,’ in A Nietzschean Bes-
tiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal, ed. Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph
R Acampora (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 100–119.
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still more to be done in order to clarify just what it is that might be compro-
mised in the absence of such independence, something to which I return
below when examining some of the positive senses in which free spirits
are free. In addition to being free from such commitment, Nietzsche’s free
spirit is free from a certain kind of accompanying feeling – namely, that
linked with a need to produce the feeling of power in this unusual way, even
to the point of extinction as those who are martyred for it. Reginster argues
for this view: namely, figures Nietzsche regards as fettered spirits (particu-
larly the so-called free spirits Nietzsche anticipates replacing), draw a sense
of their own power from their subjection to the immensely binding force
of unconditional commitment. By tying themselves to the unconditional
valuation of truth, they gather a sense of themselves as joining or being
a part of such manifestations of power. Yet another characterization of a
negative sense of freedom for the free spirits is that they are free from this
particular need, to produce the feeling of power (which Nietzsche thinks
all beings seek) in this particular way.
At the same time that this condition might be thought of as liberat-
ing, it presents us as readers of Nietzsche with a bit more trouble. Since
all beings strive for and take pleasure in the feeling of power, it remains to
be seen how Nietzsche’s free spirits actually do pursue and experience this
feeling, if not through binding themselves to unconditional commitments,
and consider whether the alternative bears any structural resemblance to
that associated with the fettered or ‘so-called’ free spirits. Put more simply,
and Reginster does not explore this, I wonder whether the relation be-
tween freedom and unfreedom that characterizes the experience of power
for the so-called free spirit is structurally similar in the case of Nietzsche’s
free spirit. The particular kind of fettered spirit we are considering in this
case unconditionally binds himself to truth, and in so doing (by becoming
bound) he realizes and finds his freedom or at least an indicator of his free-
dom. Is Nietzsche’s free spirit simply unbound in a way that the so-called
free spirit is not? All of these ways in which the free spirit is free from –
the ways in which the free spirit has freedom in a negative sense – might
appear to suggest as much, but there are positive senses of freedom that
the free spirit realizes or to which it aspires, and I will suggest that these
perhaps similarly require certain kinds of binding as well.
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2. Positive senses of freedom for free spirits
In the discussion of negative freedom of free spirits, I underscored their
independence, a feature Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes, and I explored
some of the things in relation to which the free spirit is independent. I now
wish to lookmore closely at a key passage in whichNietzsche describes this
feature of free spirits to inquire precisely about that from which the free
spirits are free. Looking for this source negatively also provides some clues
about the positive sense. Here too Nietzsche’s conception of independence
gains some complexity and subtlety that require more reflection than what
is sometimes found in the secondary literature.The passage is BGE 41, still
in the section on ‘The Free Spirit’, where Nietzsche writes:
One has to test oneself to see that one is destined for inde-
pendence and command – and do it at the right time. One
should not dodge one’s tests, though they may be the most
dangerous game one could play and are tests that are taken in
the end before no witness or judge but ourselves.
There are many questions that arise here, but I want to focus on the term
translated here as ‘independence’: Unabhängigkeit.7 Literally, this is a state
or condition of being unattached. But simply unattached might suggest
something a bit too casual. I think a stronger translation in the English is
warranted, and this stronger sense facilitates a somewhat diﬀerent under-
standing of the kind of independence Nietzsche is talking about here. Auf
Deutsch, Abhängigkeit is the term used for dependence (so it is clear how
Unabhängigkeit) yields an appropriate translation as ‘independence.’ The
‘un’ negates the ‘dependence’. Unabhängigkeit is a negative condition: to
be not in a state of dependence. While Abhängigkeit can be used to talk
about dependence in a positive sense of cooperation, is it also used to de-
scribe another specific kind of dependence that was becoming an object
of increasingly intense scrutiny both culturally and biologically in Nietz-
sche’s day, namely the kind of dependence found in contexts of addiction.
7This passage is discussed in its context, elaborating some of the same points below, in
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: A Reader’s Guide, which I co-authored with Keith
Ansell-Pearson (New York: Continuum, 2012).
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I think a stronger sense akin (if not a direct reference) to the connotations
associated with the immensely powerful pull that addiction commands is
appropriate to the context of Nietzsche’s concern.
Earlier in Beyond Good and Evil , Nietzsche links independence, when
attempted by those who are unprepared for it, with the story ofTheseus and
the minotaur, a theme that is echoed at the end of the book.8 In BGE 29,
Nietzsche writes:
Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong.
And whoever attempts it even with the best right but without
inner constraint proves that it is probably not only strong, but
also daring to the point of recklessness. He enters a labyrinth,
he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers which life brings
with it in any case, not the least of which is that no one can
see how and where he loses his way, becomes lonely, and is
torn piecemeal by some minotaur of conscience. Supposing
one like that comes to grief, this happens so far from the com-
prehension of men that they neither feel it nor sympathize.
And he cannot go back any longer. Nor can he go back to the
pity of men. –
The German in this case is ‘Unabhängig zu sein’, to be unattached. And
this passage is also related to the earlier concern about solitude, only here
Nietzsche underscores just how diﬃcult it can be to tolerate such detach-
ment. Clearly, he has in mind something more extreme than simply non-
reliance or lack of cooperation in using this term.This condition is dissocia-
tive but it is dissociative from a state of reliance or addiction on substances
that themselves induce states of dissociation. Furthermore, insofar as the
root abhang means hang below, unabhang could playfully suggest a certain
sort of defiance of gravity. This is an image invoked by Nietzsche in his
emphasis on dancing as well as flying like a bird as in ‘The Songs of Prince
8Some notable discussions of Ariadne include Gilles Deleuze, ‘The Mystery of Ariadne ac-
cording to Nietzsche,’ in Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. DanielW. Smith (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1997); and Gary Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1989).
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Vogelfrei’, the appendix to GS, and it is at the core of Nietzsche’s therapy
for combatting what he calls ‘the spirit of gravity’ in GS (especially sec-
tions 380 and 382) and Z, as mentioned below.9 All told, independence,
for Nietzsche, appears to be much more complex and potentially more sig-
nificant than it might appear at first glance.
Nietzsche provides greater focus and specificity about his intended
meaning when he returns to some related ideas later in the final section
of ‘The Free Spirit’ in BGE. In this case, Nietzsche associates free, very
free spirits with the philosophers of the future. That is, it would appear
that the philosophers of the future are free spirits, but not all free spirits
are philosophers of the future. In this section, Nietzsche directly states that
he wants to be as clear as possible about the nature of the free spirits so as
to avoid misunderstanding and confusion of them with other varieties of
free spirit advocated by those Freidenker and the like, mentioned above,
those whom Nietzsche describes as ‘levelers’; they are:
all human beings without solitude [Einsamkeit], without their
own solitude [eigne Einsamkeit], clumsy good fellows whom
one should not deny either courage or respectable decency –
only they are unfree [unfrei] and ridiculously superficial [zum
Lachen oberflächlich sind], above all in their basic inclination
to find in the forms of the old society as it has existed so far
just about the cause of all human misery and failure – which
is a way of standing truth happily upon her head! What they
would like to strive for with all their powers is the universal
green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of dan-
ger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone; the two songs and
doctrines which they repeat most often are ‘equality of rights’
and ‘sympathy for all that suﬀers’ – and suﬀering itself they
take for something that must be abolished. (BGE 44)
By contrast, those whom Nietzsche sees as truly free regard that which op-
poses the goals of the Freidenker, the opposite conditions of security, safety,
comfort, and ease, as conditions for growth, even flourishing: ‘prolonged
9I am grateful to Duncan Large for pointing out this connection.
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pressure and constraint’ facilitate growth, development, and the gathering
of strength and vigor. Famously – and infamously – Nietzsche claims cer-
tain forms of unfreedom condition the opposite spirit: ‘We think that hard-
ness, forcefulness, slavery, danger in the alley and the heart, life in hiding,
stoicism, the art of experiment and devilry of every kind, that everything
evil, terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him that is kin to beasts of
prey and serpents serves the enhancement of the species ‘man’ as much as
its opposite does’ (BGE 44). I will suggest below how we can see this as
potentially contributing to the positive sense of freedom Nietzsche’s free
spirits realize and how this is related to what the free spirits are ultimately,
possibly, able to do, but before I get to that point, I wish to take notice of
a few things. Nietzsche is not saying that ‘hardness, forcefulness, slavery’,
and the like aremore life-enhancing than their opposite – rather, he claims
they are enhancing at least as much as their opposites.This is to some extent
an acknowledgement and justification (in the sense of recognition of what
Nietzsche elsewhere aﬃrms as the innocence of becoming) of the fullness of
life, an aﬃrmation or love of all that is, rather than just the particular as-
pects we especially esteem or to which we aspire at any particular moment.
This, I suggest later on in the article, is an important aﬀective orientation
for the free spirit to take. It will play an important role in making it pos-
sible for Nietzsche’s free spirits’ detachment to not ultimately undermine
them.10
Returning to the matter of how unfreedom, more specifically, might be
necessary for or potentially in the service of freedom, we should certainly
try to gain greater clarity about the matter of whose unfreedom serves free-
dom and in what respect. One possible interpretation, one not unfamiliar
in the critical literature on Nietzsche and not without justification, is that
Nietzsche might mean that it is necessary for some to be unfree in order for
others to be free. In such a case, the unfree are sacrificed for the benefit or
advantage of the freedom of those (presumably few) others who will reap
the greatest benefits of the forced labor and limited opportunities of those
10For a diﬀerent, but interesting, account of the significance of the aﬀective orientation to-
ward truth in Nietzsche with respect to its bearing on freedom, see Peter Poellner, ‘Niet-
zschean Freedom,’ inNietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, ed. Ken Gemes and SimonMay
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 151–181.
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who are enslaved. Others are simply the means to serve the end of the
production of rare type who achieves unprecedented freedom. There are a
good number of other passages where Nietzsche makes reference to condi-
tions of servitude and subjection of this sort, suggesting precisely such an
interpretation (as for example just a few sections later in the book where
philosophers are described as exercising a ‘selective and cultivating influ-
ence’ placing others ‘under their spell’ (BGE 61), so I am not categorically
denying that it is part of the story of Nietzsche’s complicated views on
freedom. But it is also the case that part of what Nietzsche seems to think
is that unfreedom conditions a certain kind of freedom in the very same indi-
viduals – it is somehow important that those who would be free, perhaps
especially those who would be very free, must somehow first (or perhaps
in some respects simultaneously) be unfree, that, minimally, as suggested
in BGE 29, cited above, they have an inner constraint. To round oﬀ this
part of my discussion, I wish to focus on precisely this relation between
freedom and unfreedom, which will bring us back to further exploration
of what constitutes Abhängigkeit, dependence, of the sort from which the
free spirits are free. BGE 41 continues and concludes with the following:
Not to remain stuck to a person – not even the most loved –
every person is a prison, also a nook. Not to remain stuck to
a fatherland –- not even when it suﬀers most and needs help
most – it is less diﬃcult to sever one’s heart from a victorious
fatherland. Not to remain stuck to some pity – not even for
higher men into whose rare torture and helplessness some ac-
cident allowed us to look. Not to remain stuck to a science
– even if it should lure us with the most precious finds that
seem to have been saved up precisely for us. Not to remain
stuck to one’s own detachment, to that voluptuous remote-
ness and strangeness of the bird who flees ever higher to see
ever more below him – the danger of the flier. Not to remain
stuck to our own virtues and become as a whole the victim of
some detail in us, such as our hospitality, which is the danger
of dangers for superior and rich souls who spend themselves
lavishly, almost indiﬀerently, and exaggerate the virtue of gen-
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erosity into a vice. One must know how to conserve oneself : the
hardest test of independence.
Here, dependence is defined not merely in terms of consorting with others
and so on but rather in terms of ‘remaining stuck’, becoming dependent:
Not to remain stuck to a person – not even the most loved’; ‘Not to remain
stuck to a fatherland’. Nietzsche does not say, ‘Don’t love, don’t bother
thinking about or becoming involved with a fatherland’. Instead, he says
that one who is independent in the way that free spirits are described just
a few sections further on in BGE 44, avoids the lures of dependence.
Is it any wonder that we ‘free spirits’ are not exactly the most
communicative spirits? that we do not want to betray in every
particular from what a spirit can liberate himself and to what
he may then be driven? And as for the meaning of the dan-
gerous formula ‘beyond good and evil’, with which we at least
guard against being mistaken for others: we are something dif-
ferent from ‘libres-penseurs’, ‘liberi pensatori’, ‘Freidenker’, and
whatever else all these goodly advocates of ‘modern ideas’ like
to call themselves.
At home, or at least having been guests, in many countries
of the spirit; having escaped again and again from the musty
agreeable nooks into which preference and prejudice, youth,
origin, the accidents of people and books or even exhaustion
from wandering seemed to have banished us; full of malice
against the lures of dependence that lie hidden in honors, or
money, or oﬃces, or enthusiasms of the senses;
Free of those sorts of attachments one can then cultivate attachments for
other things to the point of gratitude:
grateful even to need and vacillating sickness because they al-
ways rid us from some rule and its ‘prejudice’, grateful to god,
devil, sheep, and worm in us;
Detached from the lures and preoccupations described above, one can form
interests in other things, explore them:
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curious to a vice, investigators to the point of cruelty, with un-
inhibited fingers for the unfathomable, with teeth and stom-
achs for the most indigestible, ready for every feat that re-
quires a sense of acuteness and acute senses, ready for every
venture. . .
Free spirits are not merely free of any sort of attachment; rather, they avoid
remaining stuck to such bonds – even as we have seen, to their notion of
themselves as being detached. And this condition makes it possible for them
to form other attachments, so that they are enabled to expand their range of
possible associations rather than limit it. Moreover, because of the way in
which they hold their attachments, in contrast with the fettered spirits who
are addicted to their attachments, the free spirits, at least as described here
appear to be able to love in ways that a more narrow partiality might not
allow. If this is a reasonable and appropriate interpretation of Nietzsche’s
passage here, then this provides opportunities to appreciate a distinctively
aﬃrmative dimension of Nietzsche’s sense of independence and how it
potentially impacts our relations with others.
Frequently in Nietzsche’s texts, free spirits are described in terms of be-
ing great travelers: they associate with many diﬀerent and many diﬀerent
kinds of people.This appears to be one of the ways in which they negatively
avoid remaining stuck, but I think this same characteristic also positively
contributes to who and what they are and what they are able to do. In these
very same associations, part of what the free spirit is able to do by loosening
himself from just one or several chains, is to form many more associations,
develop more and more of his own resources. In being free from the lim-
itations of the fettered spirit, free spirits are free to become something more.
But, obviously, it is not sheer multiplicity that Nietzsche admires. Rather,
he appears to think of this capacity in terms of a kind of fullness and am-
plitude, a bounty. I shall have more to say about this in just a moment.
But before doing so, I note that one of the ways in which the free spirit
cannot be free – because no one can be – is in the sense of having a free
will, realizing the classic notion of free will.
Of course, there is no single ‘classic notion of free will’, rather there
are classical notions of free will, virtually all of which Nietzsche appears to
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reject. Nietzsche repeatedly and consistently rails against this view, oﬀering
as an alternative a drive psychology that explains the experience and feeling
of willing as a particular perspective of a drive or set of drives in relation to
the others, that is, the perspective of the commanding drive or drives that
constitute us. Part of the reason why free will in this sense is not possible,
Nietzsche thinks, is because he does not think there is any such thing as
a will that somehow is in a relationship with other parts of the soul such
that it can command. There is no separate ego or I behind our actions
willing or directing in the background.We are organizations of drives, and
there are a varieties of ways in which such organizations take shape and
are maintained.11
Free spirits, by virtue of the extraordinary associations that their in-
dependence facilitates, have a greater, more expansive set of resources en-
livened, activated, and ready for recruitment in the organizations they are.
If this is right then we can also consider the various ways in which organi-
zations such as those the free spirits are enabled to become can be said to be
free (or not). This focuses the question of the freedom of the free spirit on
the relationship of its own constitutive parts or features rather than strictly
on its freedom with respect to other organizations, or its political or social
situation.
3. Challenging freedom: the difficulty of
freedom for the free spirits
Nietzsche creates something of a problem in explaining how the loosening
of attachment and the amplification of available drives can lead to strength
rather than disintegration and chaos.This seems to be precisely the kind of
risk Nietzsche conjures in association of independence with the minotaur
in the passage cited above. And it raises the question of how free spirits
capitalize on the variety they acquire through their increased associations
11I elaborate these ideas in various publications, most recently my Christa Davis Acampora,
‘Beholding Nietzsche: Ecce Homo, Fate, and Freedom,’ chap. 16 inThe Oxford Handbook of
Nietzsche, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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so that they can be said to be enabled by these resources rather than ruined
by them.
One of the dangers associated with enlivening more of the drives and
expanding their capacities by virtue of amplifying or increasing one’s asso-
ciations is that it may result in a situation more likely to produce conflict.
Homogenization of drives can be seen as in the service of a kind of rela-
tive peace, or at least the appearance of such through minimizing conflict.
The fettered soul has a dominant drive that whips into submission all the
others: The drive for unconditional truth is a drive that maintains its rule
in the fettered spirit by subjugating the other drives. Thus, it must always
guard against losing its dominance. It is hard to describe such a person as
actually free even if they have the semblance of ruling themselves. They
might have order but there is very much in them that would seem to be
unfree.
The free spirit, on the other hand, becomes an expansive multiplicity
of drives,12 and this potentially creates and nourishes more contenders for
dominance in the soul. The free spirit, perhaps more than any type among
Nietzsche’s figures, faces certain risks, including a lack of order that would
diminish rather than strengthen it. The challenge of the free spirit is to
actively recruit the drives and their cooperation so that it can be free in
another respect, namely free from certain kinds of disabling conflicts among
the drives as well as freely enabled and fit to realize the kind of activity
described above. Although he clearly articulates the need for unity in the
form of ‘giving style to one’s character’ (GS 290) and even suggests how
one might ‘combat the intensity of drives’ (D 109), I am not sure that
Nietzsche provides us with a robust account of how such unification might
come about, or how it might work out the way he envisions for those who
are not only free but also – perhaps stylishly – strong.
Nietzsche himself at times appears to wonder how this is possible. In
a passage titled ‘The wanderer speaks’, which refers to a figure featured in
the title to one of the parts of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche writes:
That one wants to go precisely out there, up there, may be
12Nietzsche expresses admiration for this type, not necessarily linked with free spirits, in
BGE 212, GS 290, TI IX 49. See discussion by Poellner, ‘Nietzschean Freedom,’ p. 153ﬀ.
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a minor madness, a peculiar and unreasonable ‘you must’ –
for we seekers for knowledge also have our idiosyncrasies of
‘unfree will’ – the question is whether one really can get up
there. This may depend on manifold conditions. In the main
the question is how light or heavy we are – the problem of
our ‘specific gravity.’ One must have liberated oneself [Man
muss sich von Vielem losgebunden haben] from many things that
oppress, inhibit, hold down, and make heavy precisely us Eu-
ropeans today.
Whether or not it is possible to achieve the kind of loosening of attachment,
the levity that would be required to achieve the perspective he anticipates,
is surely not guaranteed, and there are certain cultural conditions and in-
heritances that would seem to be opposed to this, that would make at least
modern Europeans more susceptible to the forces of (psychic) gravity, so
to speak. About this, Nietzsche continues:
The human being of such a beyond who wants to behold the
supreme measures of value of his time must first of all ‘over-
come’ this time in himself – this is the test of his strength – and
consequently not only his time but also his prior aversion and
contradiction against this time, his suﬀering from this time,
his untimeliness, his romanticism.
In this, I think we see ideas similar to the subtle distinctions Nietzsche
makes between free spirits to try to measure their freedom by their rela-
tion to the conventional views of their own time and thereby distinguish
themselves reactively and those who also loosen their attachment to their
own opposition, those who hold even the oppositional stance lightly.
While accounts of Nietzsche that emphasize the cultivation of the self
are attractive13 – both in terms of their anticipated shapely products as
well as how they tidy up this philosophical problem – I am not fully sat-
isfied with this response to the puzzle of how one might achieve unity
13See, for example Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘On Nietzsche’s Moral Therapy in Dawn,’ Con-
tinental Philosophy Review 44, no. 2 (2011): 179–204; Michael Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy:
Self-cultivation in the Middle Works (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).
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from out of the incredible diversity that Nietzsche anticipates as both the
problem and the solution to modern existence. Neither am I comfortable
with going along with solving the problems another way by elaborating
the transcendental conditions of agency and the ‘non-formal, ‘qualititative’
or substantive commitments necessary for freedom’, in large part because
I think there is simply insurmountable evidence that Nietzsche does not
have a normative ideal for what we (rather than he) might call ‘full person-
hood.’14 There would appear to be no one capable of the cultivation, no one
to be the artist of our lives, certainly no one distinct from the organization
one already is.
Yet another solution might be sought in the role that education, self-
education, and the cultivation of taste might play in shaping, organizing,
and coordinating the multifarious drives that we are.15 And there are cer-
tainly passages to be found in Nietzsche’s works that demonstrate he gave
serious consideration of such views (e.g., HH II P:2; TI ‘IX’ 47), and this
would seem to be evident in Nietzsche’s own account of himself and how
he overcame the influence of Wagner in his life and thought. But, ulti-
mately, I think Nietzsche rather doubted that this was the definite and
secure path to achieving psychic well-being. His ambivalence is expressed
in D 119, in which he begins with the idea that self-knowledge about our
constitutive elements or drives and their ‘nutrition’, how they themselves
are fed and the ways in which they nourish, is really unknown, and seem-
ingly unknowable:
Experience and make-believe. – Nomatter how hard a person
struggles for self-knowledge, nothing can be more incomplete
than the image of all the drives taken together that consti-
tute his being. Scarcely can he call the cruder ones by name:
their number and strength, their ebb and flow, their play and
counterplay, and, above all, the laws of their alimentation
[Ernährung] remain completely unknown to him.16
14See Poellner, ‘Nietzschean Freedom,’ p. 154.
15See Rebecca Bamford, Duncan Large, and Alexander Nehamas
16Citation of Nietzsche’s Dawn is drawn from Brittain Smith’s translation: Friedrich Nietz-
sche, Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality, trans. Brittain Smith, vol. 5, The
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The overall nutrition of the entity they constitute, itself appears to be the
result of chance rather than deliberate cultivation. Nietzsche continues:
This alimentation thus becomes the work of chance [Zufalls]:
our daily experiences toss willy-nilly to this drive or that drive
some prey or other that it seizes greedily, but the whole com-
ing and going of these events exists completely apart from any
meaningful connection to the alimentary needs of the sum dri-
ves: so that the result will always be twofold: the starving and
stunting of some drives and the overstuﬃng of others. With
every moment of our lives some of the polyp-arms of our be-
ing grow and others dry up, depending on the nourishment
that the moment does or does not supply.17
Associations, indeed, shape us, aﬀect the intensity of drives and their rela-
tions to others (recallHH II P:5). But any choosing of associations will be
done by and in accordance with the preferences of the drives that happen
to be on top. In short, while human growth, change, and development are
surely possible, planning it (much less orchestrating it) appears to be diﬃ-
cult if not impossible. It would seem there can be no micromanaging one’s
soul in this way because all ‘management’ of this kind will always and only
be the work of whatever drive or set of drives happen to be dominant from
the start.
In understanding Nietzsche’s conception of the independence of the
free spirit, discussed above, I think we have some suggestions for how this
might be possible. I underscore might because whatever may be the case, it
is certainly true that there are no guarantees here, no recipes or blueprints
to follow in becoming what one is. But loosening the self for attachments,
cultivating the variety of resources available would seem to make it at least
possible that a diﬀerent political or social structure for the soul might be in
CompleteWorks of FriedrichNietzsche (1881; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011),
I have also consulted Hollingdale’s translation.
17Illuminating discussion of this image of the polyp as it relates to Nietzsche’s drive psy-
chology can be found in Brian Domino, ‘Polyp Man,’ in A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming
Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal, ed. Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph R. Acampora
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 42–49.
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the oﬃng. This much is suggested in the added preface to HH II P:5,18
where Nietzsche writes:
Just as a physician places his patient in a wholly strange en-
vironment so that he may be removed from his entire ‘hith-
erto’, from his cares, friends, letters, duties, stupidities and
torments of memory and learn to reach out his hands and
senses to new nourishment, a new sun, a new future, so I, as
physician and patient in one, compelled myself to an opposite
and unexplored clime of the soul, and especially to a curative
journey into strange parts, into strangeness itself, to an inquisi-
tivieness regarding every kind of strange thing. . . A protracted
wandering around, seeking, changing followed from this, a re-
pugnance towards all staying still, towards every blunt aﬃrma-
tion and denial; likewise a dietetic and discipline designed to
make it as easy as possible for the spirit to run long distances,
to fly to great heights, above all again and again to fly away. A
minimum of life, in fact, and unchaining from all coarser de-
sires, an independence in the midst of all kinds of unfavorable
outward circumstances together with pride in being able to
live surrounded by these unfavorable circumstances; a certain
amount of cynicism, perhaps, a certain amount of ‘barrel’, but
just as surely a great deal of capricious happiness, capricious
cheerfulness, a great deal of stillness, light, subtler folly, con-
cealed enthusiasm – all this finally resulted in a great spiritual
strengthening, an increasing joy and abundance of health.
But, of course, the outcome here is uncertain and there are many possibili-
ties that emerge, including tyranny, chaos, and perhaps virtually everything
in between.19 Such risk might be inevitable and unavoidable; it might be
what is required, what must be tolerated in, perhaps even loved about,
18Citations of HH are drawn from Hollingdale’s translation (Cambridge University Press,
1986).
19If we take the free spirit not as an individual but rather more like the spirit of an age or
a spiritual capacity that might be realized by or characteristic of groups, peoples, then we
might make more headway on thinking about how such organizations and reorganizations
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the kind of experimentalism that the free spirits are supposed to exercise,
the dancing they are supposed to engage. (And not only dancing but also
‘steigen, klettern, fliegen’ [rising, climbing, flying], all of which aim to over-
come or not be subject to the pull of gravity, to hang below [abhang].)
Experiments can be planned to greater and lesser degrees, and they are vir-
tually always guided by what it is that we already know and already value,
or at least they are not wholly independent of such. Moreover, it is possible
to lose ourselves within them.20 I’m uncertain how one plans to manage
the inherent riskiness of this responsibly. But such risk might nevertheless
be necessary, and the resultant splendor that such risk-taking potentially
yields might be better described as product of chance rather than deliber-
ate calculation or determined cultivation. If this is so, then we might say
that the free spirit is free in yet one more sense – cosmically free, a piece
of fate and chance, care-free, and a ‘free throw’ of the dice.21
might work by looking at how Nietzsche thinks about the current independence of Eu-
rope, its resultant disintegration and its simultaneous desire to become one. Being ‘a good
European’ might be one way of realizing free spirituality in such a case.
20But experimentalism is not necessarily inherently good. See GS 356, where Nietzsche
writes about contemporary Europeans who are increasingly becoming like superficial ac-
tors (rather than real human beings): ‘The individual becomes convinced that he can do
just about everything and can manage almost any role, and everybody experiments with
himself, improvises, makes new experiments, enjoys his experiments; and all nature ceases
and becomes art.’ Translation by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).
21See GS 277.
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